“Let`s say the negotiations stop, here are my thoughts on how we do it. We must take the initiative both on the military front, by strengthening the bombing, and in public relations, taking the initiative to declare the negotiations. I should, of course, give detailed information on the outcome of the negotiations, which I believe will make as blameless as possible before a collapse occurs. We have a strong argument. (Message Hakto 13 quoted in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, p. IX, Vietnam, October 1972-January 1973, document 142) In his report to the President after the meeting, Mr Kissinger first referred to the various proposals and counter-proposals, amendments and revisions that were presented during the meeting. Then he developed a broader view of what was going on and what he meant, and he noted that “now, as a result of our further exploration of Hanois` intentions, it is clear that they have not abandoned their goals or ambitions vis-à-vis South Vietnam. What they did was decide to change their strategy from conventional and most important power wars to a political and insurrectionary strategy as part of the draft agreement. Thus, we cannot expect a lasting peace as a result of an agreement reached, but only a postponement of the modus operandi of Hanoi. It is unlikely that we will have a chance to maintain the agreement without the apparent willingness of the United States to trigger the hair, which can effectively be challenged at any time to enforce its provisions. However, as they say “to move the negotiations forward”, this is what emerges from the Hanoi declaration: “At the private meeting on 8 October, the DRVN page took an extremely important new initiative.

He presented a draft agreement and proposed that the government “and so on” adopt and immediately sign the agreement in order to quickly restore peace in Vietnam. In this draft agreement, the DRVN side proposed an end to the war throughout Vietnam, a ceasefire in southern Vietnam and a total withdrawal of US forces. And then it was said: “The two South Vietnamese parties will settle the internal affairs of South Vietnam within three months of the ceasefire coming into force.” November 7, 1972: Nixon was re-elected in a landslide, but U.S. forces would be withdrawn within 60 days of the signing of the agreement. Nixon`s immediate response instructed Kissinger for the December 8 meeting. “I have decided,” said the President, “that we should move forward with the second option, on the condition that the agreement we get is an improvement over the October agreement, as you suggested.” He added: “I am aware of all the problems we will have if we reach a Thieu agreement and purge the agreement if there is an agreement, but I think the risks of the other option, which is to interrupt the talks and intensify the bombing, are much greater.” (Ibid., document 150) According to Finnish historian Jussi Hanhimki, South Vietnam was put under pressure because of the triangular diplomacy that isolated it to accept an agreement that virtually ensured its collapse. [21] During the negotiations, Kissinger stated that 18 months after an agreement, the United States would not intervene militarily, but that it could intervene before. In the history of the Vietnam War, this has been described as a “decent interval.” [22] And there is a general section on future relations between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in which both sides express their belief that this agreement will mark the beginning of a new period of reconciliation between the two countries and in which the United States expresses its view that it will contribute to the reconstruction of Indochina in the post-war period and that the two countries will maintain their relations on the basis of respect for each other and not in each other`s affairs and move from hostility to normality.